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Abstract
Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) argued that the ability of
the merchant guilds to encourage trade expansion required an inter-
nal mechanism to enforce compliance to trade embargoes, otherwise
credible incentives for "embargo breaking" would have rendered them
ine¤ectual. We show that sustaining e¢ cient trade implied an ability
of the guilds to restrict their membership but no internal enforcement
mechanism was necessary. Our reformulation of the guilds´ strategies -
based on the historical evidence - makes trade embargoes self-enforcing
and allows us to provide a richer picture of how the guilds could have
facilitated trade expansion by controlling merchant trading activities.
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1 Introduction
The role played by the merchant guilds in the expansion of trade that oc-
curred in Europe during the "Commercial Revolution" remains controver-
sial.1 The "traditionalist" view is that the guilds were institutions designed
to enhance the market power of particular merchant groups. By controlling
trade, the guilds increased the bargaining power of merchants with the rulers
of medieval cities, enabling them to shift some of the xed gains from trade
from rulers to merchants via the extraction of monopoly trading privileges
and higher rents.2
In a seminal and much-cited contribution, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast
(1994) (henceforth GMW) argue for a di¤erent interpretation.3 They view
the guilds as arising in response to the commercial insecurity of European
merchants trading in foreign countries.4 Individual merchants engaging in
long-distance trade faced high risks resulting from general commercial inse-
curity and arbitrary conscations by medieval city rulers. Before a trading
center was established, a citys rulers could promise to protect the rights
of foreign merchants. But once trade had commenced, the rulers faced the
temptation to renege on this pledge, by failing to provide the promised pro-
tection or by using their coercive power to conscate merchantsproperty.
Without a credible commitment by the rulers of a trade center to provide a
secure trading environment, alien merchants would have been deterred from
trading there - an outcome that was ine¢ cient for both the cities and the
merchants. Reducing commercial insecurity and enhancing opportunities for
1Long-distance trade in Europe expanded rapidly between the eleventh and fourteenth
centuries after an extended period of decline. See Lopez (1976).
2Thrupp (1965) and North and Thomas (1973) provide the standard treatment of the
guilds as cartels; see also Dessi and Ogilvie (2004) for a recent review of the historical
literature.
3See also Greif (2006), Ch. 4.
4A view presaged much earlier by De Roover (1965). Ogilvie (2011, Ch. 6) emphasizes
that ´because most merchants only traded locally, most merchant guilds were also local.´
Hence the GMW theory applies to merchants and guilds which engaged in long-distance
trade.
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expanding trade meant that the cities and the merchants needed a means
to overcome the medieval cities"commitment problem".5
GMW use a simple repeated game model to analyze the prospects for
both bilateral reputation mechanisms (in which a merchant whose rights
were abused ceases trading), and "informal" multilateral reputation mecha-
nisms (in which the cheated merchant and his close associates cease trading),
to overcome this commitment problem and support trade expansion. They
argue that neither type of mechanism would have been able to support the
e¢ cient level of trade, creating a need for institutions which could coordinate
the responses of a large fraction of merchants to o¤enses against merchant
property. A key role of the merchant guilds, according to GMW, was to
coordinate merchants responses to cheatingby city rulers, by enforcing
"trade embargoes" against cities which failed to protect merchantsprop-
erty rights. The guilds thus allowed mutually benecial trade to occur at
higher levels than would have otherwise been possible. As GMW summarize
their argument:
It is our thesis that merchant guilds emerged with the encour-
agement of the rulers of trading centers to be a countervailing
power, enhancing the rulersability to commit to the security of
alien merchants, and laying an important institutional founda-
tion for the growing trade of that period.
The purpose of this paper is to address a number of issues in GMWs
analysis of the guilds which deserve reconsideration.6 Doing so leads to a
5More recently, the historians Gelderblom and Grafe (2010) argue that the guilds
helped long-distance traders solve two fundamental problems of exchange. They of-
fered protection against crime, warfare, and arbitrary conscation, and they facilitated
the enforcement of contracts.
6The historical accuracy of GMWs characterization of the role of the merchant guilds
has been disputed by Dessi and Ogilvie (2004) (see also Ogilvie 1995), who o¤er a third
explanation for their emergence. Dessi and Ogilvie (2004) argue that a key function of
the guilds was to facilitate "collusion" between merchants and city rulers in order to
restrict trade and maximize their joint rents, to the detriment of other groups in society.
Gelderblom and Graf (2010) describe this view as anachronistic.
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new characterization of how the guilds overcame a medieval citys incentives
to cheat foreign merchants (the "commitment problem"), thereby removing
a number of lacunae in GMWs own analysis. Specically, GMW model
the guilds as pure equilibrium coordination devices whose essential function
was to overcome the "informational isolation" of widely-dispersed traders.
They conclude that e¢ cient trade may not have been possible if the guilds
lacked the ability to enforce compliance to trade embargoes by individual
merchants, for example, by imposing commercial sanctions on their member
merchants. Otherwise, credible incentives for "embargo breaking" would
have potentially rendered the guilds powerless.7
We show in this paper that sustaining e¢ cient trade implied an ability
on the part of the guilds to restrict their membership, and to condition their
punishment strategies accordingly, but that contrary to GMW, no internal
enforcement mechanism was necessary. Our reformulation of the guilds
equilibrium strategies - based on the historical evidence - makes the threat
to impose a trade boycott self-enforcing in the absence of other enforcement
mechanisms, thus resolving the credibility issue noted by GMW. It also
allows us to provide a richer picture of how the guilds may have facilitated
trade expansion by controlling merchant trading activities, thus bringing
the "traditionalist" view of the guilds back into play, albeit for di¤erent
purposes.
A rst issue in GMWs analysis is that they model the guilds purely
as "organizations for communication and coordination" (or "automata"),
which mechanically announce trade embargoes whenever a city is observed
to be cheating. All traders learn the guildsannouncements and condition
7As Greif (2006, p. 93) has put it in his recent book: "Paradoxically, abusing the
rights of some merchants fostered the rulers ability to commit to respect the rights of
the remaining merchants.... The enhanced ability of the ruler to commit undercut the
credibility of the threat of collective punishment. The merchant guild organizations linked
information-sharing and coercive transactions between merchants in order to render credi-
ble their threat to collectively retaliate following transgression against any merchant. These
organizations provided the monitoring, coordination, and internal enforcement required to
credibly commit to collectively retaliate following an abuse." See also Greif (2006, p. 99).
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their trading strategies identically in response, i.e. all merchants o¤er to
trade if and only if a trade embargo has not been announced. But this
"minimalist" specication of guild organization would have prevented the
guilds from restricting trade to the e¢ cient level, as required for GMWs
thesis. To fulll this role, the guilds would have needed to be able to restrict
their membership to a subset of traders, and to only punish cities when they
violated the rights of guild members. It is also necessary that medieval cities
were able to discriminate between merchants, abusing or not protecting them
selectively, depending upon their identities, or guild membership.
Secondly, although ostensibly a model of the activities of merchant guilds,
in GMWs analysis the guilds rarely come into play. When they do (in their
Proposition 3), the authors immediately argue that the hypothesized equi-
librium strategies contain a counterintuitive element since they require a
city to cheat embargo breakers even if it is not in its interests to do so. By
appealing to considerations of renegotiation-proofness, GMW severely limit
the ability of the guilds to enforce trade embargoes or boycotts in the ab-
sence of an (unmodelled) internal legal system to allow the guilds to punish
noncompliant merchants.
Third, GMW appeal to the concept of renegotiation-proofness to justify
the formulation of the strategies in their Proposition 4, in which trade is
supported solely by bilateral punishment strategies. The specied strategies
are not renegotiation-proof in every relevant subgame, however.8 While
renegotiation-proofness arguments are used to explain why the ruler of a
medieval city would not punish violators of a merchant embargo when trade
on terms which the ruler would credibly respectwas possible, no explanation
is o¤ered for why the city should cheat any merchant it has cheated in
the past, as required to sustain the equilibrium. Once this assumption is
removed, the equilibrium described in their Proposition 4 unravels, leading
8At least when we apply the natural generalization of Farrell and Maskins (1989)
denition of weakly renegotiation-proof strategies as proposed in Farrell (2000), or in
Aramendia, Larrea and Ruiz (2005).
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to the conclusion that no trade will occur.
Although GMWs analysis is concerned with the e¤ectiveness of trade
embargoes or boycotts by the merchant guilds, the historical evidence they
present suggests that these were only used when cities refused to pay com-
pensation to merchants whose property had not been protected. As shown
in Harbords (2006) reconsideration of the methods used by the Maghribi
traders to support cooperative trade, this can make a major di¤erence to
the formulation of the equilibrium strategies, and to their credibility. We
therefore reformulate the guildsequilibrium strategies, to include a demand
for compensation, and show that this can make the threat to impose a
trade boycott self-enforcing for individual merchants. It thus resolves the
credibility issue noted by GMW, and makes both bilateral and multilateral
punishment strategies renegotiation-proof. By making the imposition of a
trade embargo self-enforcing, our analysis suggests that the role of the guilds
may have been primarily to collect and disseminate information concerning
breaches of trust by medieval cities (i.e. a coordination function), rather
than the enforcement of boycotts per se. The guilds did not need the power
to coerce individual merchants to take part in the punishment of cities, since
they could rely on their private equilibrium incentives to do so.
Finally, GMWs focus is on repeated-game strategies which allow the
e¢ cientlevel of trade to be supported as an equilibrium. But they do not
consider whether the merchants and the cities would have agreed on the
level of trade that they wished to support. If the guilds had the power to
restrict the equilibrium volume of trade, they would likely have wished to
impose a sub-optimal level of trade from the citiespoint of view. The same
ability to restrict trade, however, could also have been used to negotiate
favorable tax treatment for guild members in return for an agreement to
expand trade towards the e¢ cient level. As such, our reformulation goes
some way towards reconciling the two opposing views of the function of the
guilds mentioned above.
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In the remainder of this paper we reformulate GMWs theory of guilds
to address these issues. Section 2 describes the GMW model and results,
and considers some natural alternative formulations of trading costs which
alter their conclusions. Section 3 introduces demands for compensation into
the guildsequilibrium strategies, and demonstrates that these would have
been su¢ cient to sustain e¢ cient trade even in the absence of formal en-
forcement mechanisms, or sanctions, to deter embargo breaking. Section
4 considers the volumes of trade which merchants and cities would have
wished to support. Section 5 concludes.
2 The GMW Theory
In the GMW theory, merchants are identied by points in an interval [0; x].
If the number of traders in any period is x  x; the gross value of trade
is given by a function f (x). The citys costs of providing protection to
merchants are c > 0 per unit of value traded, and each merchants trading
costs are  > 0 per unit of value traded. Hence the net value of trade in any
period is [1  c  ] f (x) ; where it is assumed that c + k < 1: GMW also
assume that f is nonnegative and continuously di¤erentiable, f(0) = 0 and
f achieves a maximum at a unique value x  x (the e¢ cient volume of
trade).9 The city benets from trade by taxing merchants at a rate   c
per unit of value traded.
In any given period, if the number of traders is x and the city fol-
lows an honeststrategy (i.e. protects all merchants), its net revenues are
[   c] f (x). If the city cheatsby failing to protect a fraction 0 <   1 of
merchants, its net payo¤ is f   c [1  ]g f (x) : A merchants payo¤ when
protected by the city is 1x [1     ] f (x). Merchants who are not pro-
tected pay taxes and incur trading costs but collect no revenues, so earn
9x is e¢ cientin the sense that it maximizes the net value of trade [1  c  ] f (x).
Without further signicant loss of generality, we will also assume in what follows that f
is nondecreasing in the range [0; x]; and nonincreasing in the range [x; x]:
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  1x [+  ] f (x).10
In the repeated game, each player - the city and a continuum of mer-
chants - discounts future payo¤s at rate  2 (0; 1). The citys lifetime payo¤
when the volume of trade in period t is denoted xt and a fraction t of
merchants is cheated is
1X
t=0
t f   c [1  t]g f (xt) : (1)
Merchantslong-run payo¤s are dened similarly.
2.1 Bilateral Reputation Mechanisms with Informationally
Isolated Traders
In their rst model, GMW assume that merchantsresponses are uncoor-
dinated, and that each merchant responds to being cheated by the citys
rulers by refusing to trade with the city in all future periods.11 Merchants
strategies are thus to trade until cheated, and then never to trade with the
city again. The citys hypothesized equilibrium strategy is to trade with,
and provide protection to, any merchant it hasnt cheated in the past. The
citys lifetime payo¤ when the equilibrium level of trade is x and it cheats a
fraction  of merchants (and subsequently returns to equilibrium play) is
V  (x) = f   c [1  ]g f (x) +  [   c] f ([1  ]x) ; (2)
where  = 1  . Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields
@V  (x)
@
= cf (x)   [   c]xf 0 ([1  ]x) , (3)
and evaluating this expression at the e¢ cient level of trade with  = 0 gives
@V =0(x)
@
= cf (x)   [   c]xf 0 ([1  ]x) = cf (x) > 0, (4)
10The natural interpretation is that unprotected merchants su¤er losses post trade, i.e.
after the value of trade f(x) has been realized, rather than pre trade.
11This is justied by the assumption that merchants were informationally isolated, so
that at most a small fraction of traders ever becomes aware of cheating by the city when
they are not personally a¤ected by it. See GMW, pp. 766-767, for a discussion.
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since f 0 (x) = 0. At the e¢ cient level of trade the city will always wish
to cheat some fraction  > 0 of merchants, so e¢ cient trade cannot be
sustained by purely bilateral punishment strategies. It is this, according to
GMW, which creates an essential role for the merchant guilds.
GMWs formulation of the trading technology is special, however, and
in more than one way. Note rst that when the city cheats a fraction  of
merchants, it saves the average cost cf (x) of protecting trade of value
f (x), rather than the marginal costc[f (x)  f ([1  ]x)]: But in all sub-
sequent periods, when only [1  ]x merchants remain, the citys costs are
cf([1  ])x: While not necessarily inconsistent, it is not particularly easy
to reconcile these assumptions.12 If the city saved marginal rather than
averagecosts when it cheats, its payo¤ in (2) would become
cV  (x) = f (x)  cf ([1  ]x) +  [   c] f ([1  ]x) , (5)
while its payo¤ from playing the honest strategy is
bV (x) = (1 + ) [   c] f (x) . (6)
HencedV  (x)  bV (x) for all 0 <   1 requires
fc   [   c]g ff (x)  f([1  ]x)g  0 (7)
for all 0 <   1: Since f achieves a unique maximum at x; c   [   c]
is a su¢ cient condition for sustaining the e¢ cient level of trade as an equi-
librium.13 But this is also the condition for sustaining the level of trade x
for a guild with coordinating ability specied in Proposition 3 in GMW (see
condition (16) below). Hence bilateral punishment strategies are equally ef-
fective under these assumptions, leaving no essential function for the guilds.
12 If f (x) is concave, as GMW assume in their Proposition 4, then cf ([1  ]x) 
c [1  ] f (x), so it costs the city (weakly) more to protect [1  ]x merchants when only
[1  ]x merchants o¤er to trade than to protect a proportion [1  ]x of merchants when
x merchants o¤er to trade.
13Given the assumption that f is nondecreasing in the range [0; x]; c   [   c] is also
a su¢ cient condition for sustaining any value of x within this range as an equilibrium.
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Another oddity of the GMW formulation is that the marginal cost of
protecting an additional unit of trade decreases towards zero as the e¢ cient
level of trade is approached, and becomes negative at higher levels of trade
x > x. A natural alternative assumption would be that the costs of trade
- including the citys protection cost c and the merchants costs  - are
functions of the quantity of trade, x, rather than its value f (x). When this
formulation is adopted, the citys payo¤ when the level of trade is x and it
cheats a fraction  of merchants is
fV  (x) = f (x)  c [1  ]x+ ff ([1  ]x)  c [1  ]xg: (8)
Di¤erentiating with respect to  gives
@fV  (x)
@
= [1 + ] cx  xf 0 ([1  ]x) : (9)
Evaluating this expression with  = 0 yields
@ gV =0 (x)
@
= [1 + ] cx  xf 0 (x) : (10)
The e¢ cient volume of trade given this formulation of trading costs is now
dened by the condition
f 0(x) = c+ . (11)
Hence we require
[1 + ] c   [c+ ] (12)
to support the e¢ cient level of trade as an equilibrium (as opposed to the
less restrictive condition [1 + ] c   in the immediately preceding for-
mulation).14 Observe, though, that with per-merchant trading costs of this
type neither the city nor the merchants would typically wish to implement
the e¢ cient level of trade.15 GMWs particular specication of the costs of
14 If we assume that f is concave, (11) is then a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
sustaining x as an equilibrium.
15See Section 4 below for a more detailed discussion.
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trade, and the savings a city obtains when it fails to protect a fraction of
merchants, appears to have been crucial to their conclusion that a multilat-
eral enforcement mechanism (i.e. the merchant guild) was needed to sustain
the e¢ cient volume of trade.16 ;17
Despite our reservations concerning GMWs formulation of trading costs,
we will adopt their specication in the remainder of the paper to simplify
the exposition and comparisons with their analysis. It should be clear that
all of our results can be obtained using any of the alternative formulations
considered above, however.
2.2 Guild with Coordinating Ability
In their third model,18 GMW suppose that merchantsresponses to being
cheated are coordinated by a guild which acts purely as an information
gathering and transmission mechanism. Specically, the guild is modelled
as "an organization for communication and coordination," which mechani-
cally announces a trade boycott if the city cheats a subset of traders in any
period, but lacks any means of enforcement. All traders learn the guilds an-
nouncement in each period, but may choose to ignore it. In the hypothesized
equilibrium, the citys strategy is not to cheat any trader until a boycott is
16GMW (p. 765, footnote 19) argue that if the costs borne by the city include some
xed costs per trader, then the city would have an even stronger incentive to reduce the
number of traders (i.e. cheat), because "it would bear only a fraction of the resulting loss
of value but save all of the costs". This argument appears to ignore the e¤ect of xed
(per-merchant) trading costs in reducing the e¢ cient volume of trade.
17There is some historical evidence to support the assumption that a citys gain from
cheating alien merchants was associated with savings on protection costs. For example, in
1407 the English government was threatened with a trade boycott by Hanseatic merchants
which it had failed to protect from English pirates (Pedersen 2006, p 169; see also Kohn
2003). But other evidence points in di¤erent directions. The conict in the 1340s between
Tabriz and Genoa, for example, arose when Tabrizs ruler conscated the goods of Genoese
traders (GMW, pp. 755-756). Thus in some cases cities gained by directly expropriating
merchantsgoods. If we assume that cities gain from expropriating the value of trade, it
is easy to show that, as in GMWs original formulation, the e¢ cient level of trade cannot
be sustained as an equilibrium.
18GMWs second model considers trade supported by bilateral punishment strategies
when the assumption of strict informational isolation is relaxed.
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announced, and then to cheat any merchant who o¤ers to trade. Merchants
strategies are to o¤er to trade in any period if and only if no boycott has
been announced in the past. Given these strategies, the citys payo¤ from
cooperation at the e¢ cient volume of trade x is
V (x) = [1 + ] [   c] f (x) ; (13)
and its payo¤ from cheating every trader is
V =1 (x) = f (x) . (14)
Cheating is thus unprotable if
f (x)  [1 + ] [   c] f (x) ; (15)
or
c   [   c] : (16)
Hence, according to GMWs Proposition 3, the e¢ cient level of trade can
be sustained if (16) is satised.19
It is not clear, however, how the strategies specied in GMWs Propo-
sition 3 can support the e¢ cient level of trade x without rst limiting the
number of merchants who o¤er to trade in any period, i.e. without a mech-
anism for exogenously limiting the volume of trade to the desired level.20
That is, since the citys strategy is not to cheat any trader unless a boy-
cott has been announced, and the guilds strategy is to announce a boycott
when any trader is cheated, trade at x should result. Sustaining the e¢ cient
volume of trade would seem to require that the guild limit its membership
to x traders, and to announce a boycott if and only if the rights of guild
members have been violated. Similarly, the city must be able to condition
19GMWs description of their Proposition 3 is slightly di¤erent. They assume that
that the guild observes cheating and mechanically announces a boycott with probability
(T )  (T ); where (T ) is the fraction of cheated traders. We have assumed that
(T ) = 1 for simplicity.
20Assuming that x < x.
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its strategy on the identities of the traders, i.e. whether or not they are
guild members. We return to this issue immediately below.
GMW point out that the strategies specied in their Proposition 3 lack
credibility. Why should the city cheat all merchants who o¤er to trade
during a boycott whether it has cheated them before or not? And why
should merchants refuse to trade with a city which has cheated others when
mutually protable trade is possible on terms which the city would credibly
respect? As noted by GMW:
Although the strategies described in Proposition 3 constitute an
equilibrium, the expectations and behavior that they entail seem
implausible. The equilibrium requires, for example, that no mat-
ter how desperate the city may be for renewed trade relationships,
once a boycott has been announced, it nevertheless cheats anyone
who trades with it. In addition, traders expect that behavior. By
the equilibrium logic, the city behaves in this manner because it
expects the boycott to take full hold in the next round whatever
it does, so it anticipates that any cooperation it o¤ers will be
fruitless.
In the literature on renegotiation-proofness, similar criticisms have been
leveled at the equilibria of other repeated game models, see e.g. Bernheim
and Ray (1989) and Farrell and Maskin (1989), and more recently by socio-
biologists, e.g. McElreath and Boyd (2007) and Gintis (2004).21
In response to this, GMW allow for reversion to trade supported by
purely bilateral punishment strategies. That is, they allow for the possibility
that mutually protable bilateral trade agreements between the city and
individual merchants may be reached during a boycott. Their Proposition 4
is intended to establish the highest level of trade - bx - which can be supported
21 It has become commonplace in the sociobiology literature to argue that the use of
higher-order or recursive punishment strategies to sustain cooperation is implausibly
demanding and not observed in real human societies.
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in this way. Proposition 4 species strategies under which the city trades
with just those merchants that it has not cheated in the past, and each
merchant o¤ers to trade if and only if he has never been cheated. For a
given volume of trade x, if the city cheats x   y traders, then it can trade
honestly with the remaining y merchants if
cf (y)  [   c]yf 0 (y)  0: (17)
Trade can be sustained by these strategies up to the highest level of x,
denoted bx, that satises (17). Thus a guild lacking enforcement ability
could not credibly threaten to reduce the citys per period income to less
than [   c] f (bx) :22
But are the strategies specied in GMWs Proposition 4 themselves cred-
ible? Why should the city cheat any trader it has cheated in the past? And
why should merchants refuse to trade with a city which has cheated them in
the past when mutually protable trade is possible on terms which the city
would credibly respect? Suppose, for example, that a subgame is reached
in which @V
=0(y)
@ < 0: that is, the city has cheated x   y of traders, with
y < bx: Then a merchant who was cheated in the past will know that the
citys incentive, under the specied strategies, is not to cheat on additional
trade agreements until y = bx: (Alternatively, at y = bx a merchant who was
cheated in the past will know that by o¤ering a higher share of prots to the
city, i.e. b >  , it can induce mutually protable cooperation from the city):
Thus the strategies specied are not renegotiation-proof, as both merchants
and the city will, in some subgames, prefer to return to the equilibrium path
of play rather than carry out the required punishment strategies.
Observe also that the equilibrium specied in GMWs Proposition 4
requires that at most bx merchants o¤er to trade in any period, so at least
x   bx merchants must have been cheated in the past. But the equilibrium
22Existence of a equilibrium is guaranteed by the assumptions that f is concave, and
that: (i) cf (bx)  [ c]bxf 0 (bx); and (ii) the elasticitye(x) = xf 0(x)=f(x) is a decreasing
function of x.
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strategies do not allow for this to occur. That is, the process by which the
equilibrium level of trade is reached is not specied, making it unclear how a
city could elicit the specied volume of trade during a boycott. We address
these issues in our own formulation immediately below.
3 Sustaining Equilibrium Trade: Exclusion and
Compensation
Sustaining any particular level of equilibrium trade, either through bilat-
eral or multilateral punishment strategies, would appear to require a more
detailed specication of how trade was limited to particular groups, or sub-
groups, of traders, than provided for in the GMW analysis. And renegotiation-
proofness arguments suggest not only that GMWs Proposition 3 strategies
may not be credibly sustained, but as noted above, apply equally to the
strategies prescribed in GMWs Proposition 4. In both cases merchants and
cities are required to carry out costly punishment strategies in some sub-
games which they would mutually prefer to avoid. We resolve these issues
in this section.
First, we assume that medieval cities could elicit trade from specied
subgroups of traders, and could condition their strategies accordingly. That
is, cities could o¤er protection to just those merchants in a specied sub-
group, and leave all other merchants unprotected. This assumption would
appear to be in accord with the historical evidence. It was not unusual for
the rulers of medieval cities to guarantee safe passage to particular mer-
chants, or groups of merchants, travelling through their territories for trade.
Gelderblom (2005) details many such instances,23 and GMW (p. 752) note
that, "in medieval trade ... a city could discriminate among merchants,
23Gelderblom (2005) tells us, for example, that: "In 1243  ten years earlier than in
Flanders  merchants from Lübeck and Hamburg already received letters of safe-conduct
from the Count of Holland, who hoped they would use Dutch inland waterways to reach
Bruges." See also Lopez et. al. (2001).
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abusing or not protecting them selectively."24 And Gelderblom and Grafe
(2010), noting the ability of the English Company of Merchant Adventurers
in Antwerp and Middelburg to exclude merchants from participation in the
cloth trade, suggest that "the ability of a mercantile organization to prevent
free-riding, and reserve the economic benets of its operations to the mem-
bership" was an important and distinctive development in the organization
of the guilds.25
Second, we resolve the credibilityissues raised above (i.e. renegotiation-
proofness) by including demands for compensation in merchantsstrategies.
The historical evidence presented by GMW suggests that medieval mer-
chants only attempted to enforce trade embargoes on cities after they had
refused to pay compensation to traders whose property had not been pro-
tected. The resumption of trade also appeared to depend upon merchants
rst being indemnied for past losses.
For example (see GMW, pp. 755-756), in 1340 Tabrizs ruler conscated
the goods of many Genoese traders, and Genoa responded by declaring a
commercial embargo (a devetum). In 1344 Tabrizs ruler sent ambassadors
to Genoa promising to indemnify the traders for everything that had been
taken from them. As a consequence, the devetum was removed and Genoese
traders ocked to Iran. In another example (Pedersen 2006, p. 169), in
1407 the government of England was forced to negotiate compensation for
the losses of Hanseatic merchants in the hands of English pirates, to pre-
vent a potentially devastating trade embargo which would have closed the
continent to English cloth. Similar examples of demands for compensation
to avoid, or end, trade embargoes can be found in GMW and elsewhere.26
24And Greif (2006), p. 92 tells us: "...the ruler could discriminate among merchants
respecting the rights of some but not others. Protection of rights was a private good rather
than a public one, as a ruler could respect the rights of some merchants but not others."
25Gelderblom and Graf describe this as the "power of exclusion" and consider it the
highest form of control, dened by an ability to exclude non-members (and members who
infringed on their own rules) from a particular market.
26GMW, p. 756; p. 757; p. 760; p. 761. See also Postel (1996) and Kohn (2003). Kohn
(2003), p. 36, for instance, tells us that, by the middle of the 13th century some maritime
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3.1 Using Compensation to Support Bilateral Punishment
Strategies
To model the above points, we assume that a city can elicit trade from
a subset [0; x] of the [0; x] merchants, and can condition its behavior on
whether traders are in this subset or not, i.e. the city o¤ers protection to just
those merchants in [0; x]; and all other merchants are left unprotected. The
strategy of individual merchants in [0; x] is to o¤er to trade in each period
until cheated, and then to refuse to trade further until the compensation
1
xC is paid to them. Merchants in (x; x] do not o¤er to trade. The citys
strategy is: (i) to provide protection to just those merchants in [0; x], and
leave all other merchants unprotected; (ii) if the city has cheated (i.e. failed
to protect) a fraction x of the merchants in [0; x] in any period, pay the
compensation C to the o¤ended merchants at the rst opportunity, and
never pay compensation to merchants in (x; x]. We have the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume cf(x)  [   c]xf 0 (x) and that the tax rate that
satises 1  c      1  : Then trade of at most bx can be sustained by
the compensation payment C = cf(bx).
Proof. If the city cheats a fraction  of merchants in [0; x] in some pe-
riod t and pays the compensation C at the rst opportunity (i.e. in period
t + 1), trade at x is resumed immediately, while if the city refuses to pay
compensation it trades with the remaining [1  ]x merchants.27The citys
cities were imposing a tax on goods moving through their ports to pay compensation to
foreigners who might otherwise have taken reprisals, and that, "Genoa established a
Robbery O¢ ce to compensate foreigners who had been robbed by a Genoese (usually at
sea)." And Gelderblom (2005) tells us: "Besides defense and deterrence, protection also
implied the ability of traders to get compensation if their person and goods are damaged.
In medieval Europe merchant guilds took to collective action, often with the support of
their home government, to claim damages from host rulers. Soon enough host rulers set
up a court system to allow local and foreign traders to recoup losses from privateering,
wrongful arrests, corruption, and commercial disputes."
27We assume the following order of moves in any period: rst, the city has the oppor-
tunity to pay compensation to any merchant in [0; x] it has cheated in the past; second,
merchants decide whether or not to trade; third, the city decides whether to cheat any of
the current traders; and nally, payo¤s are realized.
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payo¤ from cheating and then refusing to pay compensation indenitely is
f   [1  ] cg f (x) + [   c]f ([1  ]x) ; (18)
whereas if it pays the compensation C in period t+ 1 it receives
f   [1  ] cg f (x)  C + [   c]f (x) : (19)
Hence a necessary condition for compensation to be paid in period t+ 1 is
C  [   c][f (x)  f ([1  ]x)]

: (20)
For the city to prefer playing the honest strategy in period t over cheating
a fraction  of merchants and then paying compensation C in period t + 1
requires
[1 + ] [   c]f (x)  f   [1  ] cg f (x)  C + [   c]f (x) ; (21)
which yields
C  cf (x) : (22)
We thus have
cf (x)  C  [   c][f (x)  f ([1  ]x)]

: (23)
It follows that an upper bound on the level of trade that can be sustained in
period t is given by largest value of x, bx, that satises the condition
cf((x)  [   c][f (x)  f ([1  ]x)]

; (24)
for all 0 <   1: Letting the fraction of merchants cheated in period t
approach zero (i.e. letting ! 0), condition (20) becomes
C  [   c]xf 0 (x) : (25)
Hence, in the limit (24) becomes
cf((x)  [   c]xf 0 (x) ; (26)
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which is just GMWs Proposition 4 condition, i.e. (17) above. Hence trade
of at most bx can be sustained by the compensation payment C = cf(bx).28
But is a cheated merchants demand that the city pay compensation itself
credible? Each merchants strategy is to discontinue trade until compensa-
tion 1xC is paid in some period t+n if cheated in period t. This is credible if:
(i) the cheated merchant expects to receive the compensation 1xC in period
t+n if it was refused in period t+n 1; and (ii) refusing to renegotiate (i.e.
by returning to the level of trade x without rst receiving compensation) is
preferable to renegotiation. The rst condition requires that in any period
t + n, n = 1; 2,..., the city prefers to pay compensation immediately rather
than waiting one period, i.e.
 C + [1 + ] [   c]f (x)  [   c]f ([1  ]x)  C + [   c]f (x) ; (27)
which is guaranteed by the condition (20). The second condition requires
that merchants who have been cheated prefer to wait to obtain compensation
over renegotiation, i.e.

1
x
C + [1     ] 1
x
f (x)  [1 + ] [1     ] 1
x
f (x) ; (28)
or
C  [1     ]f (x) . (29)
This condition will be satised for the compensation level C = cf (x) if
cf(x)  [1     ]f (x) ; (30)
or
  1  c  : (31)
Thus an equilibrium of this type can be sustained by a tax rate that satises
1  c      1  ; (32)
28 If we follow GMWs Proposition 4 and assume that f is concave, then (25) implies (20),
so (26) becomes a su¢ cient condition for sustaining bx as an equilibrium if the elasticity
e(x) = xf 0(x)=f(x) is a decreasing function of x:
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where  = 1   is the highest tax rate consistent with trade occurring (i.e.
which results in merchant payo¤s of zero).
3.2 Using Compensation to Support Merchant Trade Em-
bargoes
In the preceding subsection compensation payments were used to credibly
sustain trade via bilateral punishment strategies, i.e. punishment strategies
in which only traders who have been cheated refuse to trade until com-
pensation has been paid. But demands for compensation can also be used
to sustain the e¢ cient level of trade, by making a merchant guilds threat
to impose a trade boycott self-enforcing for individual merchants. They
thus resolve the credibility issue noted by GMW in their discussion of their
Proposition 3.
To demonstrate this, we consider a guild with xmembers, where bbx  x 
x; and bbx = bx > 0 dened by Proposition 1 above when such an bx consti-
tutes an equilibrium, and bbx = 0 otherwise.29 We then specify the following
strategies in any trading period. The guilds strategy is to announce a trade
boycott until the compensation C(x) has been paid if the city ever cheats
a fraction  of guild members, with 0 <   1. Merchants who are guild
members o¤er to trade if and only if no boycott has been announced by the
guild. Merchants who are not guild members do not o¤er to trade with the
city.
The citys strategy is: (i) to protect trade with x guild members unless
a boycott has been announced by the guild; (ii) to cheat any merchant who
o¤ers to trade that is not a guild member; (iii) if a boycott is announced
by the guild at the end of period t; pay the demanded compensation C(x)
at the rst opportunity (i.e. the beginning of period t + 1); and (iv) cheat
any merchant that o¤ers to trade during a boycott before compensation has
29Recall that there may be no bx which is an equilibrium if f is not concave, or if (32)
is not satised.
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been paid.30 We then have the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume c  [   c]x and a compensation payment of C =
cf(x)= . Then the e¢ cient level of trade can be sustained by the strategies
described above.
We provide an informal proof. For the given volume of trade x, the city
prefers playing honestly over cheating a fraction  of traders and paying
compensation C at the rst opportunity if
[1 + ] [   c]f (x)  f   [1  ] cg f (x)  C + [   c]f (x) ; (33)
which implies
C  cf (x) : (34)
For the city to prefer paying compensation C at the rst opportunity when
a boycott has been announced, to facing an indenite trade embargo requires
 C +  [   c] f (x)  0; (35)
or
C   [   c] f (x) ; (36)
for all 0 <   1: These two conditions together require
c   [   c] ; (37)
which is the same condition found in GMWs Proposition 3 (condition (16)
above). Clearly guild members will wish to o¤er to trade under these cir-
cumstances. Non-guild members will not o¤er to trade under a bilateral
30That is, we assume the following order of moves in any period t. If no boycott
is in force at the beginning of period t: rst, individual merchants decide whether
to o¤er to trade; second, the city decides whether to cheat any of the current traders;
third, the guild decides whether to announce a trade boycott; and nally, payo¤s are
realized. If a boycott is in force at the beginning of period t: rst, the city has the
opportunity to pay the compensation demanded by the guild; second, the guild decides
whether to discontinue the boycott; third individual merchants decide whether to o¤er to
trade; fourth, the city decides whether to cheat any of the current traders; fth, the guild
decides whether to announce a trade boycott; and nally, payo¤s are realized.
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trade agreement, however, since the citys threatto cheat them is credible
when bbx  x  x. Thus trade at x can be sustained by these strategies
so long as the guilds threat to impose a trade boycott when compensation
is not paid is credible, i.e. not subject to embargo breaking by individual
merchants.
For a boycott to be credible in this sense, we need to show that individ-
ual merchants will not prot from breaking a guild-imposed trade embargo,
because they expect the city to cheat them.31 That is, we need to show
that the city will prefer to follow its equilibrium strategy of paying compen-
sation over reverting to bilateral trade agreements with embargo breakers.
We adopt the natural assumption that the guild does not protect embargo
breakers by imposing a further trade boycott when they are cheated by the
city.32
Three types of embargo breaking can be considered. First, embargo
breaking by individual merchants who do not coordinate their trading strate-
gies; second, embargo breaking by "coalitions" of individual merchants who
coordinate on their o¤ers to trade, but not on their punishment strategies;
and nally, embargo breaking by alternative guilds. To keep things simple,
it is easiest to think of the set of non-guild merchants as being largerelative
to the size of the original guild, so that coalitions of any size can form.33
Given that the guild has announced a boycott, an o¤er of a bilateral trade
agreement by an individual merchant is of no value to the city, since f(0) =
0. If, on the other hand, the city pays the compensation C demanded by
the guild at the next opportunity and resumes trade at x, its payo¤ is given
31We are following Farrells (2000) denition of a quasi-symmetrically weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibriumhere.
32As Kohn (2003) notes, a guild provided its members with protection against preda-
tion, and ignoring a trade embargo meant becoming an outlaw, with no such protection.
33This will not always, or even typically, be literally true. When it is not, some mer-
chants who are considering making an o¤er to trade during a boycott will need to take
account of the loss in compensation that they would have received if the putative equilib-
rium strategies had been followed. Taking this into account makes embargo breaking less
protable for at least some individual merchants.
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by (35).34 Assuming that (36) is satised, the city is better o¤ cheating any
such merchant and paying the required compensation. Therefore, when (37)
is satised, a compensation level C   [   c] f (x) is su¢ cient to ensure
that the city will always prefer to cheat an individual embargo breaker and
return to the equilibrium level of trade x. This is su¢ cient to deter embargo
breaking because individual merchants expect every other merchant to follow
the equilibrium strategy, and not o¤er to trade. Incentives for embargo
breaking are alleviated, and any volume of trade bbx  x  x can be supported
as an equilibrium.35
A stronger condition on the equilibrium strategies would require that
they be immune to renegotiationby coalitions of individual embargo break-
ers and the city. We assume that the embargo breakers do not form an
alternative guild, however, i.e. they do not coordinate their strategies in re-
sponse to cheating by the city. So the maximum size of an embargo-breaking
coalition is bbx as dened above, since this is the maximum volume of trade
that be sustained by purely bilateral trade agreements.
To see that the e¢ cient level of trade can still be supported as an equi-
librium, assume there are ex  bbx embargo breakers, i.e. merchants who col-
lectively o¤er to trade under bilateral trade agreements with the city during
a boycott. For the city to prefer to cheat them, pay the compensation C
demanded by the guild, and then resume trade at x requires
f (ex)  C +  [   c] f (x)  [1 + ] [   c] f (ex) ; (38)
34That is, we are considering the subgame in which in period t; the city has cheated in
some period t   n, n  1; has not yet o¤ered to pay compensation, and receives an o¤er
to trade from an individual merchant. It is only necessary to consider individual o¤ers of
embargo breaking because each merchant expects all other merchants to adhere to their
equilibrium strategies. But see below.
35 If the guild attempted to enforce a volume of trade x0 less than bbx , the part of the citys
strategy which calls on it to cheat any merchant who is not a guild member would not
be sustainable, since it can credibly and protably enter into bilateral trade agreements a
further bbx  x0 traders.
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or
C  cf (ex) +  [   c] [f (x)  f (ex)] ; (39)
for all 0 <   1: Under condition (37), the right-hand side of (39) is
minimized by choosing ex to maximize f(x) in the range [0; bbx]; i.e. ex = bbx.
Note that if we set ex = x in (39), then by choosing C = cf(x) we
would obtain the compensation level for which the city will always wish
to cheat embargo breakers and return to the e¢ cient level of trade. But
this level of compensation also works equally well for any value of ex < x:
Thus the compensation level C = cf(x)=  makes e¢ cient trade immune to
o¤ers to trade under bilateral trade agreements from coalitions of embargo
breakers. Trade at all levels of x such that x > x can no longer necessarily
be supported, however.36
Finally, what if alternative guilds can form and o¤er to trade under
the strategies specied above after a boycott has been announced? Under
condition (37), it is easy to see from the immediately preceding argument
that the original guild must then contain exactly x members. Otherwise, an
alternative guild containing exactly x members can form during a boycott
and replace the original guild by o¤ering to trade at the citys preferred level.
This restricts the levels of trade which the original guild can implement.
4 What Level of Trade?
The preceding sections have followed GMW in considering merchant strate-
gies which allow the e¢ cientlevel of trade to be supported as a repeated-
game equilibrium. We have shown that by including a demand for com-
pensation in their equilibrium strategies, the guilds would have been able
to resolve the "commitment problem" noted in GMW by making trade em-
bargoes (or multilateral punishments) self-enforcing. They would thus have
36Any level of trade bbx  x  x can be supported in this case if f is nondecreasing in
x everywhere in this range. Trade in the range [x; x00) can be supported where x00 is the
smallest value of x in [x; x] such that f(x00)  f(bbx).
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been able to support trade at the e¢ cient level even in the absence of an in-
ternal enforcement mechanism to punish "embargo breakers". A question so
far neglected, however, is whether the merchants and the cities would have
agreed on the level of trade which they wished to support. We consider this
issue here.
With trade supported by purely bilateral punishment strategies, the city
rulers could control the level of trade (subject to their own incentives to cheat
individual merchants), since merchants are informationally isolated and do
not coordinate their responses to cheating by the city. As we have seen in
Sections 2.1 and 3.1 above, given GMWs specication of trading costs a city
would like to support trade at the value-maximizing level x, but incentive-
compatible trade can only occur up to the highest level bx consistent with
(17) and (26). Bilateral punishments result in too little trade in equilibrium.
When trading costs depend on the volume, as opposed to the value,
of trade, however, the city will no longer necessarily wish to support the
e¢ cient level of trade. With per-merchant trading costs (see Section 2.1), a
city would wish to support trade up to the level xc given by
f 0 (xc) =
c

, (40)
which is typically not equal to the e¢ cient level of trade x dened by (11)
above. For example, when f is concave and (12) is satised, it is easy to show
that xc > x, so the citys preferred level of trade exceeds the e¢ cient level.
Substituting into (9) we obtain @
gV =0(xc)
@ = cx

c > 0: The citys preferred
level of trade cannot be supported as an equilibrium, although the e¢ cient
level of trade can be.37
37With per-merchant trading costs, a guild wishing to maximize the total prots would
prefer the level of trade xg dened by
f 0
 
xg

=

1   ;
where xg in general di¤ers from both the e¢ cient level of trade and the level of trade
preferred by the city. When (12) is satised it is easy to see that xg < x
.
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When trade is supported by multilateral punishment strategies (i.e. by
a guild), higher levels of trade can be supported by the appropriate pun-
ishment strategies, as shown in Section 3.2. The issue then becomes the
volumes of trade which the guild is able to enforce, and whether it would
wish to support trade at the "e¢ cient" level. This in turn depends upon
the precise role that guilds played in regulating or controlling merchant ac-
tivities.38
One possibility is to assume, as in GMW, that all a guild does is to
coordinate merchant responses to cheating by city rulers, by mechanically
announcing trade boycotts, but otherwise makes no attempt to control
the number of merchants trading with a city. That is, assume that the
guild protects all merchants entering a city by calling for a trade em-
bargo (and demanding compensation) whenever it learns that any mer-
chant has been cheated by the city rulers. As noted in Section 3.1 above,
the volume of trade would increase until the average payo¤ per merchant
 (x) = 1x [1     ] f (x) becomes nonpositive, or until x = x; whichever
comes rst. Thus the volume of trade would exceed the e¢ cient level.
If the guild is also able to exert control over the number of merchants
trading with a city, as described in Section 3.2 above, then more can be
achieved. Assume now that the guild can restrict its membership to a sub-
group of traders xg < x, and only punishes the city when it violates the
rights of traders who are guild members. Would the guild then wish to con-
trol entry so as to maximize the total value of trade to its members (i.e. at
xg = x
)? Or would it want to further limit trade to increase the prots
of individual guild members? Under GMWs formulation of trading costs,
a guild that wished to maximize the payo¤s of individual guild members
would attempt to restrict trade to the level xg given by the condition
38For the purposes of this discussion we assume that the guilds determine their punish-
ment strategies independently, and cities respond optimally to them. The more complex
issues that arise in bargaining over exclusive trading arrangements are discussed briey
at the end of the section.
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f 0
 
xg

=
f
 
xg

xg
> 0, (41)
implying that xg < x. In other words, the guild would prefer to implement
a sub-optimal level of trade from the citys point of view.
If xg > bx; with bx dened by (26) above, the guild could enforce the level
xg by a¤ording protection to only xg traders. If xg < bx; and f is concave,
then the best the guild can do would be to limit the number of traders
entering a city to bx, since trade below this level would provide the city with
an incentive to elicit trade from non-guild members.39 In either case, a
guild with the power to control its membership would want to impose an
ine¢ cient level of trade from the citys point of view.40 This may be seen as
providing some support for the arguments of Ogilvie (1995) (see also Dessi
and Ogilvie 2004), for instance, as it is no longer clear that the levels of
trade supported by guilds would be superior to the levels that would arise
in their absence.
Would a guild seek to maximize the total value of trade accruing to its
members, or the average value? Certainly individual merchants within a
guild would have had strong incentives to restrict further membership so
as to limit trade and increase their own prots. There is some historical
evidence in favor of this view. Lane (1973), for example, tells us that the
frankly avowed purpose of the guild of the merchant nobles of Venice was
to help Venetian merchants make prots. And Postel (1996) notes that,
from the middle of the 14th century ... the Hanseatic meetings had to decide
on formal applications; their decision depended on whether admission was
advantageous to the Hansa or not. Writing on merchant associations in
pre-industrial Europe, Kohn (2003) summarizes the evidence as follows:
39 If  (x) is concave then xg  bx, where the inequality is strict if c <  [   c]. In this
case, the citys credible threat to trade with non-guild members acts as a constraint on
the monopoly power of the guild, as noted in Proposition 2.
40With per-merchant trading costs, a guild wishing to maximize average prots would
also want to implement the level of trade xg dened by (41).
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Some guilds, especially earlier on, were very loosely dened
and included all sorts of merchants, tradesmen, and artisans...
Later, guilds became more exclusive, with membership limited
to merchants alone or even to particular categories of merchant
trading in particular types of merchandise or to particular des-
tinations. At the same time, it became more di¢ cult to join a
guild, with membership generally descending from father to el-
dest son, and outsiders having to purchase entry at considerable
cost. The reason for the greater exclusiveness was that over time
many guilds acquired valuable rights monopolies over particu-
lar forms of trade or exemptions from various tolls and taxes.
Naturally the members wished to keep these hard-won benets to
themselves.
Thus while the guilds may have been capable of supporting more trade
than could have been achieved in their absence, the historical evidence sug-
gests that they would not necessarily have considered it in their interests to
do so.
A nal possibility is that the guilds could enter into exclusive trade
arrangements with cities in order to control the overall level of trade. From
the historical evidence referred to above, acquiring such exclusive trading
privileges was evidently a common aim of the medieval merchant guilds.41
This could in theory result in even lower levels of trade being supported
(e.g. at xg < bx; ), by the city agreeing not to trade with non-guild members.
Since the city rulers would still prefer trade up to x; compensation of some
kind would presumably have been required to obtain their agreement, either
in the form of a higher ad valorem tax rate, or a lump-sum transfer. But
this is ruled out in the current model since, under GMWs specication of
trading costs, any reduction in trade below bx results in a lower net value
41As Ogilvie (2011, Ch 6) puts it, a "universal shared purpose of merchant guilds was
to get monopoly privileges for their members."
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of trade. Thus compensating the city to implement such a reduction would
not be possible.42
An alternative would be for the guild to agree on an expansion of trade
beyond the level which could be supported by bilateral punishment strategies
(i.e. bx < x  x); in return for favorable tax treatment from the city. This
may be more consistent with the historical evidence concerning the trading
privileges acquired by guilds, and also accords with the GMW thesis that
the establishment of guilds led to trade expansion. Indeed, as GMW (p.
749) argue:
If the purpose of the guilds was to create monopoly power for the
merchants and to increase their bargaining power with the rulers,
why did powerful rulers during the late medieval period cooperate
with alien merchants to establish guilds in the rst place? What
o¤setting advantages did the rulers enjoy? The puzzle is resolved
if the guilds power enabled trade to expand to the benet of the
merchants and rulers alike.
As we have pointed out above, however, a guild whose role was merely to
coordinate merchant responses to cheating would not have been in a position
to negotiate trade expansion and tax privileges with medieval city rulers. For
this, the guilds needed to be able to control the number of merchants trading
with a city. Analyzing the bargaining game between cities and guilds over
tax privileges and exclusive levels of trade takes us beyond the scope of the
current paper.43
42With per-merchant trading costs, the guilds preferred level of trade is less than the
e¢ cient level, while the citys exceeds it, at least when we assume that (12) is satised.
Since this assumption implies that the e¢ cient level of trade can be supported with purely
bilateral punishment strategies, the city can insist on trade of at least this level. So once
again it would not be possible for the guild to compensate the city for reducing trade any
further.
43Such an analysis would need to specify what the city and the guild were bargaining over
(e.g. levels of trade and ad valorem tax rates, or levels of trade and lump-sum transfers),
and the parties insideand outsideoptions (see Muthoo 1999 for the denitions of these
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5 Conclusion
GMWs analysis is concerned with the establishment of an historical in-
stitution - the medieval merchant guild - capable of supporting e¢ cient
trade between alien merchants and medieval city-states. They conclude
that e¢ cient trade would only have been possible if guilds had the ability to
coordinate merchant responses to cheating by enforcing compliance to trade
boycotts by individual traders. Incentives for embargo breaking would have
otherwise made the guilds ine¤ectual.
As we have demonstrated in this paper, once the guildsdemands for
compensation are taken into account, no such internal enforcement mecha-
nism would have been necessary. Our reformulation of the guildsequilib-
rium strategies, based on the historical evidence, makes the threat to impose
a trade boycott self-enforcing, and resolves the credibility issue noted by
GMW. Further, demands for compensation make both bilateral and multi-
lateral punishment strategies renegotiation-proof. Thus the guilds did not
need the power to coerce individual merchants into taking part in the pun-
ishment of cities in order to support e¢ cient trade, since they could rely on
tradersprivate equilibrium incentives to do so.
Implementing particular levels of trade would have required that guilds
did more than merely coordinate merchant responses to cheating, however.
In the absence of any ability to control the number of merchants trading
with a city, the incentives of individual traders could easily have led to
volumes of trade well above the levels desired by either cities or guilds. An
ability to control their own membership (and to only punish cities when they
violated the rights of guild members), gave the guilds the power to restrict
terms). For instance, would the city continue to benet from trade at level bx while
bargaining was taking place (making it an insideoption)? Would this trade occur with
potential guild members, or with outsiders? And so on. Dessi and Ogilvie (2004) consider
a game in which the guild makes lump-sum transfers to city rulers in exchange for exclusive
trading privileges. They assume that the city makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the guild
however, which simplies the bargaining problem.
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the equilibrium level of trade. A guild which aimed to maximize the average
prots of its members would then have wished to implement a sub-optimal
level of trade from the citys point of view. But the same ability to restrict
trade could also have been used to negotiate favorable treatment for guild
members, in return for an agreement to expand trade towards the levels
desired by cities. This may provide some support for the GMW thesis that
the establishment of the merchant guilds led to trade expansion in the late
middle ages.
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